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TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO LAW:
A TREATMENT FOR THE SCHIZOPHRENIA OF
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL REGIMES
GEORGE

S. ROBINSONf

Very interesting! I'm glad I didn't know any
of this or I might not have gone.'
I.

FICTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CONTEMPORARY TRAVEL

T HIS casual observation could refer to innumerable practical

and
speculative situations which the average man encounters every
day of the week. One reason for such an exclamation is the infinite
maze of fictions each of man's cultures has created to facilitate the
daily necessities of the world's cultural groupings, as well as the various
individual fictions each person creates to ameliorate his own existence.
Each facilitating fiction has its value in the comparative accuracy of
sustained predictability of biotic and abiotic behavior. The conglomerate of fictions characterizing a given cultural grouping is embodied
in the institution we all refer to as "the law." It is submitted that
"the law" must be re-evaluated, within the guidelines set forth in the
ensuing discussion, as a necessary first step in replacing the schizophrenic complexion of legal fictions with realistic and quantifiable
components of the nature of man and his ecosystem.
A particularly apt and familiar example of refined horizontal
layerings of legal fictions, which are inherently alien one to the other,
is found in the environment of international air travel. Indeed, even
domestic air travel from one remote region to another in some of the
more vast political boundaries, such as Brazil, Australia, and the Soviet
Union, would provide an adequate model for study. Rapid and massive
contemporary air transportation as a communications medium forces
the internationally-minded jurist to re-evaluate the intellectual-professional-economic characteristics of representatives of alien cultures
t Assistant General Counsel, Smithsonian Institution. A.B., Bowdoin College,
1960; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1963; LL.M., McGill University, 1967, D.C.L.
1970. Member, District of Columbia and Virginia Bars.
The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and are not intended
to be attributable to any institution or organization with which he is associated.
1. Quip by Michael Collins, former Apollo XI astronaut and presently Director of
the Smithsonian Institution's Air and Space Museum, after reading several of the
author's articles dealing with law and space activities.
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communicating within the framework of this medium. 2 The businessman no longer is the principal air traveler. Representatives of such
diverse activities and professions as athletes, teachers, housewives,
students, and skilled as well as unskilled workers, are all traveling in
large numbers throughout the world. While some are on business,
some are merely traveling for private reasons, and still others are
resuscitating the Victorian concept of the "Grand Tour." The common
thread of these travelers is that, for the most part, they will confront
on a practical level - usually for comparatively short periods of time characteristics of several cultures wholly alien to their own. For example, the parochial interests and concepts intercommunicated will be
less than complete and satisfactory as the African Masai warrior leaves
the sophisticated surroundings of Munich's World Olympics and
returns to his remote, nomadic tribe.'
Quite simply, the massive and rapid movement of people about
the world is creating a supra-national culture - an economically unselective "jet set" with one foot in extremely parochial cultural institutions, and the other firmly in the schizophrenic manifestations of
a very cosmopolitan international fraternity of broad views and tentative
relations. One only has to be aware, during an average international
flight, of the multifaceted civil and criminal legal relations established
by the Chicago, 4 Warsaw,' and Tokyo Conventions,6 bilateral extradition treaties, the innumerable alien jurisdictions silently acquiesced
in, immigrations, customs, and health regulations, to deplane at destination, gasp in awe and disbelief, and murmur "I'm glad I didn't know
any of this or I might not have gone."
II.

LEGAL FICTIONS V. EMPIRICISM OF
NATURAL

DISCIPLINES

The vast web of intricate relations among biotic and abiotic components of man's environment -

man's ecosystem -

ultimately dic-

tates the shape of his cultures and their quantifiable variations. Culture,
2. For a partially detailed discussion of this problematic area and its potential
consequences, see Robinson, New Nomads - Mass Air Transportationand the Need
for Juridical Institutions to Minimize Cultural Shock, 5 INT'L LAw. 452, 452-78 (1971).
3. For a statistical breakdown and description of representative characteristics of
the contemporary air traveler, see Institut du Transport Aerien, The Air Traveller A Modern Proteus, Bull. No. 4, at 75, Jan. 22, 1968. The general trend indicated by
this report is an evolving pattern of mass cultural confrontations.
4. Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591.
5. Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
6. Convention on Aviation: Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), Dec. 4, 1969, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S.
No. 6768.
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thus defined, is now so sophisticated in procedures and colorful trappings
that it is not only a collective response to, but also an integral component of, the human ecosystem, such that basic biological influences
tend to inhibit intercultural integration or accommodation. This author
has previously argued that:
[A]ccommodation of alien cultures, as opposed to their attempted
integration through force, was an essential requirement for avoiding conflict.7
Subsequently he has departed somewhat from reliance upon the accommodation of alien cultural contradictions as a means of avoiding conflict.8 In the present era of technology and speed, the necessary accommodation corollary of cultural lag cannot be relied upon to avoid
conflict. All the functional drawbacks of cultural lag are intensified
by the compounding of legal fictions, which are applied in error to
correct the problems arising from confrontations of representatives
from alien cultures. A refined aspect of this view is that the underlying bio-ecological dictates leading to aggressive behavior, violence,
and cultural conflict, must be redirected through interdisciplinary engineering techniques. This, in turn, necessitates an evaluation of cultures
(and juridical institutions as one component of many in a given
culture) through the use of natural disciplines and within the framework of an ecological methodology.
As a necessary first step, what the preceding view contemplates
is a restructuring of a good portion of legal academic curricula throughout most of the Western world. Most law, in this writer's view, is
taught on the basis of rote - "the use of memory [usually] with little
intelligence. .

.

. [R]outine carried out without understanding of its

meaning or purpose." 9 While this method is responsive to the need
for good tailors and mechanics of the law, it is not acceptable as a
means of training and cultivating creative jurisprudents. Although
this is a matter which should be explored extensively in its own right,1"
it is sufficient for present purposes to realize that most law is taught
by law school faculties which are unable - by training and use
to separate juridical treatments of "law" subjects from their own
parochial, political considerations and quasi-convictions regarding universal, but very flexible, concepts of morality and ethics. For the most
7. Robinson, supra note 2, at 478.
8. See generally Robinson, NASA's Space Station and the Need for Quantifiable
Components of a Responsive Legal Rigime, 6 INT'L LAW. 292 (1972).
9.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

1977 (1971).

10. For preliminary discussions about academic inadequacies in the area of training creative researchers in the origins of law and legal regimes, see Robinson,
Metalaw - Prolegomena to Quantification of Jus Naturale, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

722 (1972).
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part, law seems to be taught and understood as a set of shop-worn,
unresponsive, and rather questionable legal positivisms which have
been distorted and disfigured by individual political and theological
opinions. Students of the law are left with no tangible sense of, or
feeling for, their subject. Their gift at commencement is a fleeting
sense of positivistic abstractions, some with Latin and Greek symbols,
and others of such common nature as to obviate distinctions between
the proud holder of a new law degree and any other individual with
his semantically-structured view of the law and human relations in
general. Small wonder that the average, and not-so-average, international and planetary traveler would view the world of the jurist as
a haven for professional schizophrenics. Thus, the law graduate of today
is more often than not, intellectually crippled by his law school
experience.
For centuries man has looked for the common denominator in
satisfactory legal relations among all geo-ethnic groupings. Consistent
failure led to accentuations of the differences among such groupings,
and emphasis upon the need to establish laws to protect the integrity
of those differences. But few jurists, particularly in the Western
World," looked beyond cultural variations to the real differences, i.e.,
the controlling physical factors leading to cultural variations. These
factors are real, measureable, often tangible, capable of stimulating
most senses, and -

most importantly -

they are universal for

Earth's ecosphere. In this discussion they are referred to as bioecological dictates intellectually articulated by man in the form of
cultural manifestations.
The vast majority of law schools offer their students no more than
a one-semester, two-to-three hour course dealing with the cultural
origins of law, generally referred to in a rather deadening and uninspiring fashion as "legal philosophy" or "jurisprudence." It invariably challenges the student to untangle, in as short a time as possible,
the completely absurd "soul mutterings" derived from a half century
or more of a given individual's imperfectly articulated introspections.
Occasionally, a rare individual will elucidate the principal issues surrounding the natural underpinnings of laws and legal regimes, 12 but
that truly is a rare occasion. Even the contemporary, no-nonsense,
11. Two notable exceptions were Jeremy Bentham and Roscoe Pound, the latter
of whom appeared to be a biologist first, and a jurist second. The accuracy and depth
of their views seem to have been constrained only by the lack of certain empirical
evidence presently in the embroyonic stages of quantification. See generally A.
HACKER, POLITICAL THEORY: PHILOSOPHY, IDEOLOGY, SCIENCE

(2d ed. 1968).

12. The obvious example is Lon L. Fuller who prepared the provocative fictional
inquiry that has delighted all recent law students. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers - It the Supreme Court of New Garth, 4300, in LANDMARKS OF LAW 59
(R. Henson ed. 1960).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss3/2

4

Robinson: Toward a Phenomenological Approach to Law: A Treatment for the Sc
FEBRUARY

1973]

CONTEMPORARY LEGAL REGIMES

seek-tangible-truth, law student, when demanding drastic curriculum
reform "to deal with the inefficiency and non-responsiveness of the
legal and judicial systems," is really not asking for a restructuring
permitting analysis of the generation of legal institutions, but rather
is asking for the addition of consumer-protection law, community law,
ghetto-relevant law, and other similar courses. This, it is submitted,
is a reaction confined to lesions. It is not the sacrifice necessary to
tear apart, study, evaluate, and design corrective procedures. The
maze of the cultural surface is barely scratched - there is no breakthrough to the underlying causal mechanics. The "relevant-minded"
law student is really saying:
We do not want to sit around like sheep and be led into the
big corporations. We all do not know what we want to do
when we get out of law school, but we do not want to end up
as the quasitraditional movement lawyer.13
And so, the fictions of law are pyramided and perpetuated.
III.

LONG-DURATION

JURIDICAL

SPACE

MICROCOSM

ACTIVITIES -

FROM

ANALYSIS

AN EXISTENTIAL

OF

A

POSTURE

Today, long-duration manned space flights under extreme stress
are a reality. Exceedingly long-duration space flights in manned orbiting space stations are close to becoming a reality. In view of the
recent United States-U.S.S.R space station accord, 1 4 space station

participants in the very foreseeable future are apt to be representatives of alien cultures, different races, and both sexes. This is one
environment in which legal fictions cannot be relied on, even for short

periods of time. The overall Earth/space operational environment,
is too alien and synthetically oriented to permit reliance on untested
and unquantified fictions. Such reliance would lead to a broad-scale
failure in much the same manner as tradition legal fictions have failed

on Earth.' 5
13. Washington Post, Apr. 22, 1972, § F, at 2, col. 1 (quotation attributed to
George Washington University law student).
14. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation and the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, May 24, 1972,
[1972] 23 U.S.T. 867, T.I.A.S. No. 7374. For a fairly broad and somewhat unique
look at this area of space activities, see Robinson, supra note 8.
15. A very delightful summation of this view appears in Gordon, Old Orthodoxies
Amid New Experiences: The South West Africa (Namibia) Litigation and the
Uncertain Jurisprudence of the Interational Court of Justice, 1 DENVER J. INT'L L. &

POL. 65, 92 (1971) :
However, beset by a decline in popular enchantment with international adjudication as a dispute settlement modality, the judges have instead chosen to cling
publicly to outworn jurisprudential banners and to accept the verity of reified
concepts which, for the most part, are alienated from rational and empirical judicial

analysis. Dancing to rhythms the band is no longer playing, the Court remains
inelegantly out of step, its latest judgment . . . an attempt to vindicate old orthodoxies in the face of new experiences.
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Although the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has developed hard, practical experience in managing (1)
limited resources in a synthetic life-support system, and (2) attendant relationships among participants in the manned space programs,
one integral facet of these operations has not received the attention
it demands - namely, the study of legal principles applicable to all
biotic and abiotic components essential to effective management of the
total synthetic ecosystem upon which manned space flight is dependent.
In this respect, jurisprudential "scientists/engineers" should be
ripe for the opportunity to view and evaluate the interactions of man
in a totally controlled environment, and to develop responsive juridical
institutions accordingly. Without question, it will be difficult for
them to refrain from extending the usual anthropocentric legal positivisms into the new and unusual arena of man-in-space.
Why should we search for the underlying, universal precipitants
of legal principles in a bizarre, remote, synthetic, continuously experimental, limited, and constrained, orbiting space station? The
rather fundamental and somewhat pristine response is that comparative methodology of the extremes is the most fruitful for creating
a quantifiable and effective understanding of our Earth-indigenous
legal regimes. Realistic perspective often can be attained by temporarily avoiding direct confrontation with seemingly insurmountable,
complex problems, and drawing applicable parallels from peripheral,
but unique and creative, constructs. A space station and shuttle
transport system with international participants provides a microcosm of a transnational ecotone society"6 in laboratory conditions under
which every physiological, psychopathalogical, morphological, and
like requirements of each participating individual is measured with
precision. The principal liability in this approach is that it requires
a team of universally cosmopolitan and well-disciplined minds, capable of dealing with precision with the natural disciplines - capable
of grasping the essence of these disciplines at any given time in the
evaluation of a phenomenon, or of interrelated phenomena, and then
formulating a resolution of an attendant problem.
As a methodology, we need to study anthropocentric legal regimes in an environment alien to our genetic coding, as in man's
protracted space activities as influenced by synthetic life-support systems. Hence, there is the need to postulate responsive legal regimes
16. A social grouping of this nature might be referred to as an "ecotone society."
If one accepts the view that cultures are intellectually articulated responses to, or
manifestations of, bio-ecological dictates, then it might be said that adjacent alien
cultural groupings are separated by a buffer zone, much in the same manner as the
buffer zone of mutual accommodation between two or more biotic provinces. This
inter-ecosystem zone of tension is referred to as an "ecotone."
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based upon analysis through practical and theoretical physics. In
this methodology, quantification of sensed or perceived phenomena
provides the absolutely essential tool for reasoned speculation. To
postulate or develop a measurable legal system which is responsive
to the realities of physical laws - or alternatively, a truly effective
jus naturale, man must leave his innumerable and unstable senses
of ethic and morality to the realm of individual motivation, and evaluate his self/social-preservation requirements within the context of
all biotic and abiotic influences of, at a minimum, his immediate
ecosystem.
It may be helpful at this point if a brief review is made of the
type of biocultural studies and evaluations that must be made to (1)
ensure total understanding of the relationships in a space station society,
and (2) anticipate the most appropriate, effective, and responsive
biocultural engineering techniques to be applied to such a society."
In 1966, in a symposium sponsored by NASA to discuss the effects
of confinement on long-duration, manned space flights,' 8 seven of
the major problem areas deemed likely to arise in establishing the
psychological and engineering requirements necessary for the type of
environment envisioned for long-duration space flights were identified
as follows:
1.

Failure of individuals to adjust to confinement in isolation.

2.

Unsatisfactory relations between crew members.

3.

Deterioration of performance of individuals and crews.

4.

Failure to meet personal satisfactions of crew members.

5.

Physiological impairment occasioned by exposure to the
space environment.

6.

Inadequate mission simulation.

7.

Space equipment improperly designed for long missicns. I9

Definition of these major areas has been refined to some degree
by the observation that five factors will command the societal relationships of a space crew: (1) crew size, (2) crew composition,
17. Within the contextual framework of legal principles or regimes, the basic
areas of interest for study are: (1) law regarding use of a space station deriving
from unilateral or multilateral sponsorship and international participation; (2) law
applicable to transport operations of a space station shuttle; and (3) law regarding
relations among space station inhabitants, as well as among those inhabitants and
members of control units on earth, i.e., management and sponsoring organization.
Robinson, supra note 8, at 293.

18. See Wise, Analysis of Anticipated Problems, in

SYMPOSIUM ON THE EFFECTS OF CONFINEMENT

IN

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
LONG-DURATION MANNED

NASA
SPACE

(1966).
19. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 297.

FLIGHTS
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(3) use of leisure time, (4) protecting the right to be different,
and (5) optimal organizational considerations."0 It can be seen
rather easily that these factors can be studied in terms of the biological sciences, as well as in the form of legal principles. Some of
the broad biological subheadings involved in the methodology of
study are: (1) pecking order, (2) status leveling, (3) xenophobic
attitudes, (4) sensory deprivation and violence, and (5) violence as
a congenital dictate and acceptable principle of group behavior.
IV.

ARE

THE BIOLOGICAL

SCIENCES

THE PROPER

FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGIN OF CULTURES
AND

LEGAL

INSTITUTIONS

FOUNDATIONS
GENERALLY,

SPECIFICALLY?

Morality or ethics or theology is not the cause of culture, but
an integral manifestation thereof. A productive laboratory for the
most objective observation and evaluation of the true precipitant
causes of cultural institutions is the space station or other long-duration manned space probes. At this point, it is timely to discuss
why culture -

specifically, evolved laws of a culture -

has its

roots in bio-ecological origins. Much of the basis for this view is
still at an unacceptable level of quantification and empirical verification. On the other hand, enough such verification is available
to indicate strongly that the cultures of hoino sapiens derive their
forms and contents from genetic coding and the type of nurturing
permitted them in a particular environment. 2 For this we have a
certain amount of parallel bio-data from experimentation with, and
observations of, the taxonomic sub-species. Dr. S. Dillon Ripley,
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, has quite properly emphasized:
[C]omparisons most often made to human societies from the
findings of behavioral biology have been the intriguing ones, not
necessarily those that are valid. The breadth of the implications
of discoveries of animal behavior is recognized by all, but the

manner of applying them to specific human situations is con20. These five major areas were established by the Institute for Creative Studies,
Washington, D.C., and were discussed in the report of a study undertaken for NASA.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, LONG-DURATION MANNED SPACE
CERTAIN NON-ENGINEERING ASPECTS (1970).
21. This writer makes no attempt, herein, to resolve the issue of "nature" versus
"nurture," bitterly debated for so long by the hereditarians on the one side, and the
cultural environmentalists on the other. Neither genetics nor the environment has
independent significance, either biologically or within the context of the learning
processes. The only facet of the issue which has functional significance, both in the
natural disciplines and juridically, is the controlling fabric of interdependent relationships between nature and nurture.
MISSIONS -
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tested everywhere. It was in just this way that social Darwinism
accumulated destructive legacies for our century.22
As a general caveat, Dr. Ripley's observation is quite good. However, it must be kept in mind that Darwin's data and the resultant
theories which evolved are not the causal factors of the "accumulated
destructive legacies." Scientific data and knowledge are always at
a relative level, always inchoate. Social or political perversions of
data are, for the most part, the designed consequences of political,
economic, theological, moral, or ethical parochialisms which may be
traced to very definite and measurable bio-ecological dictates, once
the intellectual articulation of moral and ethical values is rejected
as inappropriate to our scientific methodology.
Trite or obsolete polemics too often have the tendency to raise
man above and beyond the reach of his biological origins - to
isolate man's tremendous cerebral imaging and reasoning capabilities
by disregarding the integral and sophisticated interdependence of
abstract thought and the morphophysiology that serves as, and in
support of, an extremely sensitive data-sensing station. Representatives of the natural science disciplines and the exacting "science of
law" must not be frightened into abandoning the rigors of true
scientific methodology by the terrorism of contemporary polemics
and irrational indictments.
The use of comparative anatomy and social behavior in the
non-human zoological species, for conducting objective investigations
into the nature of man and the cultural manifestations responding
to that nature, is essential. Further, it helps man to view his biological nature and cultural characteristics from as close to a nonanthropocentric view as possible.23 The majority of scientists in the
various subdisciplines of behavioral biology probably agree that culture is "not an appropriate word to use in regard to animal societies."'24
Dr. Ripley is inclined to agree, but only to the extent that culture
"is a human word drawn from our own vocabulary . . . [and] it
may be . . . too overlain with our own prejudices." 2 In confirmation of this writer's own firm beliefs, Dr. Ripley appears to share a concern that anthropocentrically oriented definitions of sentiency and
22. Ripley, Preface to MAN AND BEAST: COMPARATIVE SOCIAL BEHAVIOR at 5-6
(J. Eisenberg & W. Dillon eds. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as MAN AND BEAST].
23. The advantage of this approach can be seen in the recognition of certain of
the cetaceans (particularly porpoises) as intelligent, even according to anthropocentric
standards and value-forming processes. For a discussion of this non-anthropocentric
posture for studying man, in his individual as well as societal capacity, see Robinson,
supra note 10, at 710.
24. Ripley, supra note 22, at 9.
25. Id. at 10.
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culture are disintegrating with still further discoveries in the language of animal species, such as vocal dynamics being discovered
in the unexpected range and variety of bird song and the sophisticated vocalizations and "cultural" activities of certain of the cetaceans. "We may be in the presence of a kind of language for which
our own experience and habits of thought may not be prepared." 6
Of course, all the legal institutions of the world's cultures are, by
definition, anthropocentrically derived and oriented. Mankind is now
only beginning to sense that "intelligence" assumes many alien forms
on Earth and that the classical anthropocentric criteria and definitions
of that distinguishing characteristic are no longer to be considered
exclusive. Obviously, it is very difficult for man to associate both
his intellectual and biological traits with the behavioral characteristics
of the phylogentically lower (more accurately described as "alien")
orders of animals. The difficulty very likely has its roots in the
much articulated view:
[O]vertly at least, humans differ from other animals in the
possession of [an abstract] language and in the evolution through
language with social dynamics, introspective thinking, and patterns of behavior which having long since evolved through
21
language, now overlie and subordinate instinctive behavior.
The issue to be studied, then, is not the nature of symbolic
language and abstract conceptualization; rather, it is the degree of
sophistication and complexity of the interrelationship between man
and his total eco-system which those genetically derived assets have
created. Herein lies the common thread consisting of universal factors
dictating man's multitude of varied cultural laws.
V.

THE EMPIRICAL

"IMPLICATION"

Rather extensive studies are being made in the area of biochemical changes that precipitate the "emotions" of fear, anxiety, anger,
and guilt. In the area of applied medical research, equal effort is
26. Id.
27. Id. at 9. It is interesting to note that the most highly evolved and sophisticated facet of human communication is neither verbal nor written; rather, it is the
"silent language" in which gesture, facial expression, social spacing, fashion, timing,
failure to speak or respond, and like devices, offer a subtle and extensive, in-depth
form of communication. Except for the necessary speed for communicating symbols
of technology, refinement of the "silent language" could well be the methodology for
international and/or culturally-alien space crews. It should be recalled that this long
has been the principal means of communicating the basic biological and societal
requisites of many subhuman animal species. See E. LENNEBERG, BIOLOGICAL FOUNDASee also Wilson, Chemical Communication Within
TIONS OF LANGUAGE (1967).
Animal Species, in CHEMICAL ECOLOGY 133 (A. Sondheimer & B. Simeone eds. 1970).
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being put into the other end of the problem, i.e., how to restore a
state of proper biochemical balance and, hence, emotional stability
or normalcy. Glen McBride, and others, have worked to show that
caste organization in the social groupings of lower animals2 8 is a
response to the workings of the endocrine system, or what he refers
to as the "hormone environment." Furthermore, in the smaller be
havioral unit of societal roles, there appear to be biochemical changes
attendant to behavior expressing such roles; for example, fear results when:
[D]eviation in external context has produced an internal state
expressing the deviation, and the animals move to reduce their
internal deviation by removing the external disturbance. The
common strategy is for the group to gather tightly or flee.2"
McBride continues by observing that there is an electrochemical
basis for the organization and expression of these behavior units. The
"electrical system" initiates, modifies, and terminates the overall
chemical state of an organism; it probably controls the "intensity
and concentration of the chemical organizers" as well." ° To confirm
the conclusions of direct observation and experimentation, weakened
by empirical gaps, McBride reasons inversely from the behavioral
manifestations:
We sense these internal conditions and name them as the
emotions of fear, anger, anxiety, guilt, and so on. We know
very little about the [biochemical] organization of emotions,
yet we have methods of reducing their intensity: negative feedback mechanisms which restore the equilibrium state."'
After briefly reviewing the evidence of biochemistry (not simply
neurophysiology) as the basis of emotions, with the long-range im28. McBride defined
animals in space, arising
than from discontinuities
definition, see McBride,

society in its simplest form as "a non-random distribution of
from the spacing behavior of animals to neighbors rather
in the physical environment." For a full discussion of this
Society Evolution, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ECOLOGICAL
SOCIETY OF AUSTRIALIA 1-13 (1966).
"Society" is also defined by relying on man's
unique capacity to communicate, and subsequently to act in concert, through the use
of abstract conceptualization and symbolics: "An association or company of persons...
united together by mutual consent, in order to deliberate, determine, and act jointly
for some common purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1562 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)
(emphasis added). The only apparent functional difference between the two definitions is the objective of a common purpose. However, the first definition appears to
assume a common purpose in spacing, with the additional assumption of direction by
genetic coding. Since various lower orders of animals can communicate, by mutual
consent, for the purpose of learning, deliberating, and determining a common course
of action, we see that there really is no inherent, substantive difference in these
definitions, but only a semantic difference.
29. McBride, The Nature-Nurture Problem in Social Evolution, in MAN AND
BEAST, supra note 22, at 47.
30. Id. at 48.
31. Id.
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plication that it serves in an almost inconceivably sophisticated way
as the foundation of abstract conceptualization, McBride suggests
the obvious concluding speculation - many, if not all, aspects of
behavior may be genetically coded, "and in this form . . . transmitted
automatically from generation to generation." 2 Further, the real
problem of applying observations of genetically coded behavior in the
lower primates to man is the need to account for the evolution of
learning. McBride states that a new and very complex system of
coding behavior was required:
[It had to retain] only behavior reinforced positively, avoiding
that reinforced negatively. . . . Yet the ability to code behavior
could not become a new genetic system until the routine transmission of behavior in regular patterns could evolve.33
After this had occurred, selective coding and uniform transmission
of behavioral patterns "became a new inheritance system itself coded
in the genotype and evolved by natural selection."'3 4 This system is
referred to, generally, as cultural genetics.35 While it is only one
among several theories, partially validated empirically, it is not intended to account for the sophisticated learning processes of man
that lead to his apparently unique capacity to conceptualize abstractly,
e.g., to rationalize the "higher law" controlling the evolution of man's
more mundane legal positivisms. That is much too remote a conclusion - indeed, speculation - to accommodate the present void
between hypothesis and quantificable conclusion. However, it should
be emphatically recalled at this point that the principal objective of
connecting bio-ecological dictates with behavioral manifestations and
cultural characteristics is to provide a certain amount of behavior
pattern predictability for structuring accurately responsive legal regimes. Such regimes are necessary to correct unacceptable imbalances in societal behavior, or provide a sanctioned framework in which
the maximum societally beneficial, biological demands can be satisfied.
The two basic behavior modes, with both genetic and environmental roots, are (1) violent and aggressive characteristics and (2)
32. Id. at 51.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. For that dichotomous branch of cultural genetics dealing with the influence
of neurological evolution on behavior patterns, see Plogg, Neurological Aspects in
Social Behavior, in MAN AND BEAST, supra note 22, at 94-125. For a discussion of
the biological foundations of the more subjective behavior traits, see Hamilton,

Selection of Selfish and Altruistic Behavior in Some Extreme Models, in

MAN AND

supra note 22, at 57-91, wherein it is posited that altruistic and selfish behavior
patterns are of genetic derivation for the purpose of population or societal (as opposed
to individual) preservation. Further, that spite, if of mutant derivation, leads to
termination of a species.
BEAST,
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manifestations of societal cooperation. These two modes are precisely
what legal regimes are designed to accommodate (aggression) and
encourage (cooperation). Some biologists believe that aggression
and violence show characteristics of neurological control equatable
with man's basic drives - thirst, hunger, and sex.3" For this reason,
"aggressive behavior may have an appetitive phase where the organism actually seeks out an object to fight."37 Of course, there are scientific views to the contrary which place emphasis on early experience
and conditioning as the origin of aggressive behavior, suggesting
that "an organism can be conditioned to fight and positively reinforced by winning."3 The extent of the physiological basis of aggression is in dispute. Although these views are based on empirical observations of non-human species, it should be re-emphasized that the
caveat is not to avoid comparison of behavior patterns; rather, it
is to avoid being "too rash in extending the results from the study

of one species to another."3 9
The second basic mode - cooperation - usually occurs within
the framework of shared societal norms. Cooperation might be defined readily as "the collaborative behavior of two or more . . . [organisms] in the production of some common behavioral effect." 4 As
in the definition of "society", the concerted behavior is usually directed
toward some goal of common interest. Although, to date, we have
36. See generally Wilson, Competitive and Aggressive Behavior, in MAN AND
supra note 22, at 189-217. See also K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (1966).
37. Eisenberg, Introduction to Part II of MAN AND BEAST, supra note 22, at 131.
Competition should not be confused with aggression, although the two occasionally
can be interdependent operants. Intra- and inter-species competition generally are
considered to result from population density with respect to availability of necessary
resources, such as sex, food, and space.
38. Id.
39. The work of J.H. Crook in animal cooperation, for example, has emphasized
principally the biological and pattern characteristics of the primates. See Crook,
Cooperation in Primates, 58 EUGENICS REV. 63-70 (1966) ; The Socio-ecology of
Primates, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF BIRDS AND MAMMALS (J. CROOK ed. 1970). See
also Crook, Sources of Cooperation in Animals and Man, in MAN AND BEAST, supra
note 22, at 235-60. Obviously, the rationale is that man must turn to his primate
heritage for the more accurate homologies dealing with behavior. However, as
Eisenberg has quite appropriately observed:
[I]t is prudent to bear in mind that many of the emergent mechanisms one can
discern in the primates have developed in a parallel fashion if not in a homologous
fashion within other related mammalian taxa. ...
BEAST,

Knowledge of the existence of functionally similar behavioral mechanisms
within mammalian societies other than these primates is fundamental to an understanding of social evolution. Only when mechanisms for spacing, promoting cohesion, bonding, and cooperation have been defined for many species can we
meaningfully examine the questions of homology with respect to physiological
substrates. Much confusion concerning the biological bases for so-called "drives"
can be dispelled only if we continue to study and infer within a broadly based
series of comparisons.
See Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 137-38.
40. Crook, Sources of Cooperation in Animals and Man, in MAN AND BEAST,
supra note 22, at 238.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

18 : p. 407

no means whereby lower orders of animals can be asked their reasons
for a given behavioral characteristic, "the past history of an organism and the environmental context may allow us to infer something
regarding its motivation."'" For that matter, most men are incapable
of meaningful articulation of those measurable reasons for certain
facets of their own conduct. The evolution of cooperation as a consistent behavior pattern involved both genetic and environmental
nurturing, "adaptive rather than merely homeostatic and responsive
rather than autonomic, Lamarckian as well as Darwinian." 4 2 Separation and isolation of individual members of a social grouping is insufficient to study and determine both the individual and social natures of such members. Reductionism simply is inadequate to understand evolution of group processes. Inferences from comparative
anatomy, physiology, and behavior, and then employment of an empirical ecological methodology are necessary to quantify the bases
43
of man's behavior patterns.
In summarizing the role of cooperation in comparative behavior
patterns,4" J. H. Crook observed that both homo sapiens and simians cooperate better when closely identified with the needs of the
group of which he considers himself a member:
Men, like monkeys . . . are socially mobile, and may change
the frame of reference of their activities from a narrow sectarian
concern to broader issues of wider significance. An understanding of the forces controlling the maintenance of social position
in relation to human needs in terms of identity, in group membership, self-esteem, and compassionate empathy would much
improve our chances of social control.45
Although only a few examples of verifiable lower animal behavior patterns validly applicable to man have been touched upon
herein, there are a multitude of even more "frightening" similarities.
The frightening aspect arises from an appalling neglect - even designed avoidance - of man's biological roots by social scientists.
The fact is, we have not progressed very far from the "great revelations" wrought by the famous Scopes monkey trial.
41. Id. at 239.
42. Id.
43. As with man, cooperation can be ensured in the lower primate groups through
social control of individual behavior. In this respect, see Gartlan, Structure and
Function in Primate Society, 8 FOLIA PRIMATOLOGICA (Switzerland) 89-120 (1968).
See also Crook & Butterfield, Gender Role in the Social System of Quelea, 16 ANIMAL
BEHAVIOR 370-84 (1970).
44. In this respect, see M. SHERIF & C. SHERIF, GROUPS IN HARMONY AND
TENSION (1956).
45. Crook, supra note 40, at 256.
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FOUNDATIONS OF "ANTHROPOSENTIENCY"

SUFFICIENTLY UNIQUE TO REMOVE

-

MAN'S JURIDICAL

INSTITUTIONS FROM BIo-ECOLOGICAL DICTATES?

To determine whether it is proper to pursue the empirical data,
and consequent lessons, afforded by natural disciplines as the path to
the universal thread common to all cultures and superficially alien legal
regimes, it is necessary first to resolve the state of uniqueness of man's
intellectual perceptiveness. The question can be framed simply: are
the behavioral attributes which characterize man unique to him? In
the alternative, as posed by Eisenberg:
If not unique, do all of man's behavioral attributes have a continuity in the past and, in an evolutionary sense, are the well
springs for man's behavior tied to physiological mechanisms which
are indeed homologous to those mechanisms that can be discerned

in other animals ?40

There are representative scientists who believe that man's predisposition to learn or perceive is an inherited characteristic and that
cerebral physiology accommodates certain learning patterns usually manifested at critical stages in biological development. The interesting
aspect of this view is that culture - the consummate aggregate of
learning patterns and conceptualization - has a reverse influence on
the morphophysiological development of its biological foundation. Concisely, symbolic communication preceded, at certain stages of neurological evolution, the development of an ever-enlarging brain in man.
Ultimately, "culture became, by a feed-back process, the major selective
pressure operating on humans to shape their forms of behavior and
indeed their ultimate brain size. '"'
If one accepts this postulate, it can
be seen that not only must the relationship between the biological
roots of man's behavior patterns and his societal or group characteristics
be studied; those characteristics - or culture - must be studied solely
within the framework of their bio-ecological origins. Only through
this methodology can the needs of alien cultures, or behavior patterns,
be understood with the accuracy essential to formulate properly re48
sponsive legal principles, or, indeed, entire legal regimes.
The greatest obstacle to legitimate contemporary analysis of human
biology as the foundation of culture and its juridical components is
46. Eisenberg, Introduction to Part III of MAN AND BEAST, supra note 22, at 265.
47. Id. at 266.
48. For an interesting treatment of the difficult problems of the origin of intuition, clearly the mode of learning or knowing most closely tied to biological, as
opposed to rational, factors, see S. LANGER, MIND: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN

FEELING

(1967) ; Langer, Speculations on the Origin of Speech and its Communicative Function,
46 Q.J. SPEECH 121-34 (1960); Langer, The Great Shift: Instinct to Intuition, in
MAN AND BEAST, supra note 22, at 313-32.
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an anthropocentric obsession with man's unique stature within Earth's
biosphere. It was, and continues to be, a truly sentient attempt by
man to define himself. The definition has always started from the
premise that in the animal world, man is unique - not simply different - from other animals. Since man is allegedly catholic in his uniqueness and not just different from the "lower" orders of animals, the
search for a definable substance of that uniqueness has never seriously
incorporated the total fabric of man's biological origins. Only recently has the colonial tactic of forcefully superimposing one culture,
always believed to be superior, upon another, been recognized as nonresponsive and harmful. Indeed, entire alien legal systems were, and
are now to a lesser degree, forced upon bioculturally insensitive societal
groupings, e.g., the British in India, the French in Indo-China, or,
of course, America in its treatment of the American Indian.
Culture has always been considered a phenomenon unique, or
peculiar, to man. Similar and even identical characteristics in "lower"
orders of animals are distinguished, for example, by reference to "social
traits," notwithstanding the fact that those "traits" often render the
lesser species equally as successful in their respective media, perhaps
even more so than man is in his. It should be recalled that the issue
of man's uniqueness is being discussed here solely within the context
of its relation to similar behavior patterns in lower orders of animals.
This should not be confused with the evolutionary fact that every
species is unique since it is the end product of a particular path of
evolution. Man's sentiency does not render him unique in the traditional sense - only biologically different. To avoid facing similarities
in cultural criteria, man has incorporated into his definition of culture
a reliance upon abstract symbols for communication and a capacity
for an individual to satisfy the anthropocentrically-oriented criteria for
intelligence, as opposed to intelligence or culture manifested only in a
societal context. As observed by Robin Fox:
We get a little uneasy when told that [lower] animal communities
also have "traditions" that get passed on, so we retreat into
symbols ....Preeminent among the symbol systems is language,
and when all else fails we can cling to language. "By their speech
ye shall know them." 49
The more that proponents of eugenics emphasized the biological
origins of human behavior, the more intensely did the politicists and
49. Fox, The Cultural Animal, in MAN AND BEAST, supra note 22, at 278. Fox
provides a rough definition of "culture," in the anthropological vernacular, as referring "to traditional modes of behaving and thinking that are passed on from one
generation to another by social learning of one kind or another." Id. at 277-78.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss3/2

16

Robinson: Toward a Phenomenological Approach to Law: A Treatment for the Sc

FEBRUARY

1973]

CONTEMPORARY LEGAL REGIMES

social scientists emboil the concept in the tangled polemics of "racism."
Even today, attempts to illuminate congenital biological influences on
human behavior patterns are castigated both within and without the
scientific community as nothing more than the dialogue of "incipient
racism." 5 The fear of such racist epithets paralyzes analysis. Contemporary social scientists suffer more than anthropologists from this
aberration of scientific methodology since sociologists are taught (1)
the need for direct involvement in social interactions and (2) that
the need for corrective measures in societal imbalances must be predicated on existing definitions of morality and ethics. In any event, the
consequence is the denial of any connection between culture and biology,
even at the universal level. And so, legal principles and institutions
continue to be established on foundations of contemporary, but evershifting, fictions, i.e., the prevailing ethic and morality.
Ever since Karl Marx predicated social behavior on economic
theory 1 and summarily dismissed the virtues of reductionist methods

for determining the applicability of comparative zoological behavior
patterns in understanding societal dynamics, political/legal emphasis
seems to have shifted even more to fictions. Further, anthropologists

such as Sir Arthur Keith were expounding the view that the human
infant was a tabula rasa on which culture imprinted itself, and that
the development of the various elements of culture was such that one
simply never discovered a given society having a religion, but no
language, or a sophisticated legal regime, but no religion, and so
forth.52 Everywhere, one is inundated with scientific, as well as political,
rhetoric that "[b]iological universals cannot explain cultural differentials." 5 3 After all, everyone knows (tongue firmly in cheek) that
50. A recent example of the perpetuation of incipient racism hiding under the
heading of "Pure Science," is William Shockley, of Nobel fame. Apparently, his
scientific methodology in the discipline of electronics is not applicable to the field of
genetics where his "expertise" is less well known. See Rogers, Brave New William
Shockley, ESQUIRE, Jan. 1973, at 130. In this respect, B. F. Skinner also has
suffered his share of professional and personal attacks for the eccentricity of his
methodology in the discipline of psychology. See B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND
DIGNITY (1971); R. EVANS, B.F. SKINNER: THE MAN AND His IDEAS (1968).
51. See generally KARL MARX: ECONOMY, CLASS, & SOCIAL REVOLUTION (J.
JORDAN ed. 1971). For discussions more directly related to the present context, see
MARX AND ENGELS: SELECTIONS FROM THEIR WRITINGS ON THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS

(R. MEEK ed. & transl. 1953).
52. See generally A. KEITH, A NEW THEORY OF HUMAN EVOLUTION (1948).
53. Fox, supra note 49, at 279. Fox further explains her advocacy of a broad
biological base for understanding culture:
Muslims, I was told, take off their shoes to go into church while Christians take
off their hats. Now find me a biological explanation for that! I was never sure
I wanted to find any kind of explanation for it. It seem to me a pretty arbitrary thing.
Id. Lionel Tiger confirmed Fox's observation that regardless of the multitude of
overt symbolic variations in male group behavior, one fact stands out:
Men form themselves into associations from which they exclude women. These
associations [vary in their expressed purposes] but in many of their processes they
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the sophisticated variations in courtship patterns among different species
of birds is the result of genetic coding, while the variations in courtship
patterns among different human ethnic groupings finds its elevated
origins in culture.
Perhaps the most intriguing, as well as frustrating, obstacle to
overcome in connecting the biological origins of man with his cultural
manifestations is the determination of the extent of influence of those
origins on man's capacity to conceptualize. As should be clearly evident
by now, there is no doubt in this writer's mind that man's cultural
complexion - specifically, his legal institutions - are dictated by the
vast permutations afforded by the interplay of genetic coding and environmental permissiveness and encouragement of those heritable capabilities. What is not necessarily constrained biologically is man's capacity to conceptualize abstractly, i.e., there is no physical limitation upon
his dreams and fantasies. However, even the boundlessness of his
imagination is limited in substantive articulation and manifestation
to the constraints imposed by biological preservation of the organism
and its species. In short, we have the kinds of cultures and societies
we have because we are the kind of biological species we are.5 4
If one uses the available data from physical anthropology to trace
the biocultural evolution of man, within the context of the present
discussion, two basic facts stand out: (1) important elements of anthropocentrically-defined cultures were evident in representatives of prehomo sapiens simian troops with brain sizes significantly less than
the minimal limit of 750 cc. set by Sir Arthur Keith; 55 and (2) if
our ancestors were to survive the rapidly changing circumstances of
the Pleistocene epoch, they had to rely more on a synthesis of data
from the left and right sides of their brains than did their relatively
immediate predecessors, and "a premium was put on the capacity for
cultural behavior." 6 Long before there was a clear distinction between honro sapiens and the "lower" primates, our ancestors had opted
(probably through a mixture of conscious determination and instinctive
reaction to existing physical circumstances) for the skill, cunning, and
rapid adaptation permitted by the conglomerate responses of culture
as their means of survival. The success of this approach very likely
are remarkably uniform. A seemingly bewildering variety of male behavior can
be reduced in effect to a few [universal comparative behavior] principles once
this is grasped.
Tiger, Men in Groups, in MAN AND BEAST, supra note 22, at 281.
54. This position is tantamount to the argument of the psychic unity of mankind,
i.e., that certain basic cultural activities are stock responses of the human psyche to
external pressures.
55. See Fox, supra note 49, at 278.
56. Id. at 291.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss3/2

18

Robinson: Toward a Phenomenological Approach to Law: A Treatment for the Sc

FEBRUARY

1973]

CONTEMPORARY LEGAL REGIMES

was rough and spotty at first. As with all selective evolution patterns,
there also must have been a strong element of risk in timing and in
ecological circumstances that could have made the relatively gradual
reliance on culture for survival distinctly lethal in the final analysis.57
In short, man's uniqueness is his traditional biological weakness:
[C]ulture does not in some mysterious sense represent a break
with biology .... [It] does not represent a triumph over nature,
for such a thing is impossible; it represents an end product of a
natural process.58
Based on the above discussion, man's cultural characteristics might
be best expressed as deriving from a conglomerate of biological-environmental potentialities for action, instinct, learning, and the development
of habits or neurophysiological patterns subliminal to the conscious.5 9
These genetic predispositions or "leanings" may be considered the
results - severally and collectively - of that form of Darwinism
peculiar to the human species. As noted by Fox, one aspect of this
view is the capacity to study the "quasi-instinctive cultural behavior
of man .. . in much the same way and by much the same methods
as ethologists study the truly instinctive behavior of other animals."6
The importance of this penultimate inclination lies in the universal
behavior pattern continuities and alternatives expressed by homo sapiens, as opposed to those of specific geo-ethnic groupings of man. In
the present context, it is the bio-ecologically induced continuities and the
predictable alternatives in behavior patterns which permit accurately
responsive legal regimes for all men, regardless of their respective
morality, ethics, geo-ethnic origin, and location at any given time. 6'
57. Although the changeover for early man from principally instinct to principally
culture as a means of survival was, and continues to be, an inherently risky option,
it did provide for a survival technique greater than, for example, the instinct that
makes the common honeybee and ant societies superior in organization and efficiency
to that of man. While human cultural processes allow for a certain amount of
adaptability, the instinct of the individual honeybee or ant is too rigid to accommodate
rapid change.
It is questionable whether this observation is still valid if one views the
total activity of a given honeybee or ant society as a culture composed of the distinct,
but integrated, activities of component individuals. Likewise, an individual human can
be thought of as a cultural entity composed of billions of individual cells functioning
through genetically coded instinct. It is submitted that such a shift in perspective
changes the import of certain biological constraints on "culture." It is this principle
that is being suggested for the establishment of a creative and accurately responsive in a biocultural sense - legal regime.
58. Fox, supra note 49, at 291-92.
59. Id. at 292-96.
60. Id. at 295. For a good discussion of the instinct/intuition/intellect issue, see
generally N. TINBERGEN, THE STUDY OF INSTINCT (1951).
61. See Jaynes & Bressler, Evolutionary Universals, Continuities, and Alternatives, in MAN AND BEAST, supra note 22, at 337-39.
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Is THE CULTURAL GENIUS OF MAN CAPABLE OF FORMULATING
JURIDICAL INSTITUTIONS TO GUIDE HIS TRANSNATIONAL
BEHAVIOR WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS OF VIOLENCE?

Although application of certain conditioning techniques 62 may be
instrumental in assisting future nonviolent cross-flows of alien cultures
in acutely different ecosystems, the point in time for effective mass
application is quite distant. Aggression control and latent cultural antagonism are the principal juridical problems in moving individuals,
as well as rather sizable groups, from a familiar and secure ethno-ecosystem through one or more distinct communities with different perhaps intensely abrasive - biocultural allegiances, and back again.
Although contemporary research is beginning to probe methods of
aggression control (e.g., in addition to the Masters/Houston type of
research, 3 there is use of brain stimulation, brain lesions, hormone
administration, and appropriate drugs) , 4 the state of the art vis-A-vis
application to the world's traveling public is tantamount in accuracy
and responsiveness to the witchcraft of the Druids exercising the
ancient rites of the Celtic priesthood. In short, reliance for successful
inter-societal accommodation for the foreseeable future will remain on
legal precepts. The main challenge, of course, will be the transformation of such precepts from fictional foundations to immediately responsive and flexible bio-ecological foundations. The use of norms
as symbolic bases for ideal human behavior patterns must be replaced
by data gathered by the methodology of existential phenomenology.
Lorenz often observed that one of the principal factors for influencing
acceptable manifestations of aggression - regardless of the intensity
or multitude of variations - "is not to deny its existence but to accept
its existence and strive to redirect aggressive impulses into groupcoordinated activities and sublimates." 65
Although the most dour and pragmatic of the natural discipline
scientists would agree that political and legal institutions are necessary - although not devices of salvation by themselves - these institutions generally are considered secondary in nature in that they "reg62. For a discussion of phenomenological research in the area of mind expansion

and discernment of all levels of the conscious and subconscious, see R. MASTERS &

J.

HOUSTON, PSYCHEDELIC ART (1968)
OF PSYCHEDELIC EXPERIENCE (1966).

; R.

MASTERS & J. HouSTON, THE VARIETIES

63. Id.
64. See generally AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR (S. Garattini and E. Sigg eds. 1969).
See also Moyer, Internal Impulses to Aggression, 31 TRANSACTIONS N.Y. ACAD. ScI.
104-14 (1969).
65. See Eisenberg, Introduction to Part IV of MAN AND BEAST, supra note 22,
at 351; See generally K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (1966). See also Robinson, supra
note 8, at 292-312, in which the author discusses violence as an acceptable principle
of law during isolated, long-duration space flights.
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ister changes of a more basic cultural character, once such changes have
gone far enough to make such registration possible." ' 6 Despite this,
many, if not most, scientists believe that the time span in which man's
accreted critical problems of societal survival can be resolved through
changes in genetically derived behavior patterns is too short to anticipate
successful aversion of biologically catastrophic consequences. Cultural
solutions to these problems must be imposed; substantive laws and
effective sanctions must be embodied in a bio-ecologically sensitive legal
regime. It is submitted, therefore, that the real question is not whether
man has the creative genius to formulate juridical institutions to guide
his transnational behavior patterns within acceptable limits of abrasiveness or violence. Rather, will man remove the fictional constraints from
his behavioral patterns? Will he rely on accurate observations of the
interplay between his congenital dictates and his environment? Will
he escape the sterile, but compelling, sanctuary inherent in the observation: "If I had known all that I would not have gone !"
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has highlighted the basic problem inherent in the rapid movement of one or more persons from an indigenous ecosystem, through several alien ecosystems, and back again,
within a comparatively short time-frame. That problem, specifically,
is the conflict of alien ecosystems manifested as cultures.
It is submitted that legal positivisms are formulated to minimize
the effects - not the causes - of such conflicts. Because jurists and
legislators deal with manifestations and effects, and not with quantifiable cause-and-effect relationships, the predominant tendency is to
experiment with, and search for, methods and principles that mitigate
expressions of abrasiveness and conflict. The result is the establishment of a matrix of interconnected legal fictions that respond to the
symptoms and not to the etiology. For this reason, the pattern of
Western jurisprudence, at least within the framework of communication through rapid transportation, has been to develop bodies of law
having no direct contact with the total environment, which in turn has
led to the ultimate disintegration of an effective identification of that
law. The result is a corpus of schizophrenic law which suffers from
the inherent self-destruction attendant to the inability of its legal fictions
to deal with the cause of a problem after the shifting concepts of
morality and ethics have changed the symptoms.
66. Halle, InternationalBehavior and the Prospects for Human Survival, in
supra note 22, at 359.

MAN

AND BEAST,
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If one accepts that universal human behavior patterns exist, regardless of genotypes or eco-ethnological origins, then it is necessary
for the jurist to set about isolating and quantifying them with scientific
methodology. It has been submitted that such behavior patterns are
biochemically dictated. Further, that jurists looking for the common
threads influencing behavior patterns of all mankind may well find the
operation of a space station or lunar colony to be a productive microcosmic laboratory. Much research is needed in order to isolate factors
of common interest as the foundation of transecosystem legal regimes.
The adversary method of developing a body of conflicts of laws to
deal with confrontations among alien cultures and representatives of
alien ecosystems has proved to be superficial, temporary, and progressively antagonistic on a protracted basis.6 7
It has certainly not been the intent of this Article to arrive at
definitive conclusions. Rather, a position has been taken which seriously
questions the responsiveness and effectiveness of the traditional law
school curriculum and teaching methodology. It also has been submitted that the mutuality of interest factor existing among all representatives of mankind, regardless of geo-ethnic origins, has its roots
in bio-ecological origins. It is finally submitted that law schools ought
to develop basic programs designed to interrelate law with current
quantifiable knowledge deriving from the application of technology to
the natural sciences, and that definitive research be undertaken, within
the framework of a graduate law school curriculum, using scientific
techniques to obtain a more precise understanding of basic legal
mechanisms. Such programs would involve analysis and quantifiable
evaluation of the natural discipline underpinnings of legal principles
and/or regimes in order that the amenity of existing legal institutions
to future modification could be determined and that juridically related
institutions, likely to be of critical importance in the distant, but
foreseeable future, could be identified.
67. See, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOIcE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965); B. CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); B. LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1959).
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